Secure Coding with Python

OWASP Romania Conference 2014 24th October 2014, Bucureşti, România







About Me

Started to work in IT in **1997**, moved to information security in **2001**. Working in information security for over a decade with experience in software security, information security management, and information security R&D.

Worked in many roles like Senior Security Engineer, Security Architect, Disaster Recovery Specialist, Microsoft Security Specialist, etc... etc...

Leader of "OWASP Python Security" Project

http://www.pythonsecurity.org/

Co-Leader of "OWASP Project Metrics" Project

• <u>https://github.com/OWASP/OWASP-Project-Metrics</u>



• **OWASP Python Security Project**

A new ambitious project that aims at making python more secure and viable for usage in sensitive environments.

- We have started a full security review of python by checking core modules written in both C and python
- First goal is to have a secure layer of modules for LINUX

The security review takes a lot of time and we are slowly publishing libraries and tools, documentation will follow ③



OWASP Python Security Project

Python Security is a free, open source, OWASP Project that aims at creating a hardened version of python that makes it easier for security professionals and developers to write applications more resilient to attacks and manipulations.

Our code in GITHUB:

• https://github.com/ebranca/owasp-pysec/

Known Issues in python modules concerning software security:

• <u>https://github.com/ebranca/owasp-pysec/wiki/Security-Concerns-</u> <u>in-modules-and-functions</u>



Total Software Flaws (CVE) 01/2001 to 12/2013 7,000 6,000 5,000 4,000 3,000 2,000 1,000 n 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Series1 http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/statistics

After checking statistics generated from vendors we have to also check data generated by the community at large.

Statistics on publicly disclosed vulnerabilities are available at the site "NIST.gov" under the name "National Vulnerability Database"


http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/statistics

We will review vulnerability stats:

- By Access vector
- By Complexity
- By Severity
- By Category


Then we will formulate some conclusions.







Number of Software Flaws (CVE) by Complexity 5,000 4,500 4,000 3,500 3,000 2,500 2,000 1,500 1,000 500 0 2011 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2012 2013 ---- Series2 ---- Series3 http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/statistics





- Initial review of "National Vulnerability Database" statistics revealed:
 - Number of public vulnerabilities relaying on "network" is decreasing
 - Number of public vulnerabilities relaying on "local network" access (adjacent networks) in increasing
 - Number of public vulnerabilities relaying on "local access only" access in increasing
 - Medium or low complexity Vulnerabilities are preferred



- Analysis of the "Web Application Vulnerability Statistics 2013" report revealed:
 - Rate of server misconfigurations is increasing
 - Authentication issues are increasingly not checked
 - Authorization issues are increasingly not checked
 - Server application headers are not sanitized
 - Server application error are not filtered
 - Server default files/dirs are left accessible



- How network configurations can impact internal code operations?
- IP Fragmentation
 - <u>https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/IP+Fragmentation+Attacks/13282</u>
 - <u>http://www.snort.org/assets/165/target_based_frag.pdf</u>
 - <u>http://www.icir.org/vern/papers/activemap-oak03.pdf</u>
- Depending on the system reading the fragmented packets arriving at the NIC, the reassembly process can either DESTROY or REASSEMBLE the original stream, as an application may have sent valid data but the receiving end may see only random data.



OWASP The Open Web Application Security Project

def genjudyfrags():

pkts=scapy.plist.PacketList()
pkts.append(IP(flags="MF",frag=0)/("1"*24))
pkts.append(IP(flags="MF",frag=4)/("2"*16))
pkts.append(IP(flags="MF",frag=6)/("3"*24))
pkts.append(IP(flags="MF",frag=1)/("4"*32))
pkts.append(IP(flags="MF",frag=6)/("5"*24))
pkts.append(IP(frag=9)/("6"*24))
return pkts

This section of code will generate six packet fragments as outlined in "IP Fragment Reassembly with scapy" with the offsets specified in the Shankar/Paxson and Novak papers.

The picture is taken from the Novak paper and represent the final packet order per each reassembly policy.

http://www.snort.org/assets/165/t arget_based_frag.pdf





python -OOBR reassembler.py -demo

Reassembled using policy: First (Windows, SUN, MacOS, HPUX)

Reassembled using policy: Last/RFC791 (Cisco)

Reassembled using policy: Linux (Umm.. Linux)

Reassembled using policy: BSD (AIX, FreeBSD, HPUX, VMS)

Reassembled using policy: BSD-Right (HP Jet Direct)



• What about numeric operations?

As an example we will take in consideration LINUX.

Many security operations are based on random numbers and every linux system using any cryptographic function can be impacted by the lack of good entropy.

What is generally overlooked is that under linux almost every process uses entropy when is created and even the network stack uses entropy to generate the *"TCP-syn cookies"*.



- This is an expected behavior and is working as designed.
- Spawning a process uses (on average) 16 bytes of entropy per *"exec()",* therefore when server load spikes entropy is quickly depleted as the kernel is not generating entropy fast enough.
- Also when a system is built to use "Stack Smashing Protector" (SSP) by default it uses "/dev/urandom" directly, this tends to consume all the kernel entropy.
- Almost all modern Linux systems use "Address space layout randomization" (ASLR) and stack protections that need a small amount of entropy per process. Since "/dev/urandom" always remixes, it doesn't strictly run out, but the entropy drops.




- In fact many linux command used to check the amount of entropy are "consuming" it and may lead to it's depletion.
- For example this command will "consume" entropy

 watch cat /proc/sys/kernel/random/entropy_avail
- But this python one-line script will NOT use entropy:
 - python -c "\$(echo -e "import time\nwhile True:\n time.sleep(0.5)\n print open('/proc/sys/kernel/random/entropy_avail', 'rb').read(),")"
- Also the command "inotifywatch -v -t 60 /dev/random" will monitor the access to "/dev/random" without using entropy




• What happens to the entropy level in a working linux server under average load?





Under linux every process uses entropy and every server "should" not have less than 200 bits. It is possible to increase the entropy level using entropy deamons like the package "haveged". (<u>http://www.issihosts.com/haveged/</u>)





• PYTHON for networking?

Scapy	libdnet	dpkt	Impacket
рурсар	pynids	Dirtbags py-pcap	flowgrep
Mallory	Pytbull	Otrace	

• **PYTHON** for fuzzing?

Sulley	Peach Fuzzing	antiparser	TAOF
untidy	Powerfuzzer	Mistress	Fuzzbox
WSBang	Construct	Fusil	SMUDGE



• OWASP Secure Coding Principles

- 1. Minimize attack surface area
- 2. Establish secure defaults
- 3. Principle of Least privilege
- 4. Principle of Defence in depth
- 5. Fail securely

6. Don't trust services

- 7. Separation of duties
- 8. Avoid security by obscurity
- 9. Keep security simple
- **10.** Fix security issues correctly



• In reality "Secure coding" is a **PRACTICE**

Practice: "the actual application or use of an idea, belief, or method, as opposed to theories relating to it"

The definition of "secure coding" <u>changes over time</u> as each person/company has different ideas.

 Is about how to DESIGN code to be inherently secure and NOT on how to write secure code



- As a PRACTICE secure coding includes but is not limited to:
 - Definition of areas of interest
 Analysis of architectures involved
 Review of implementation details
 Verification of code logic and syntax
 Operational testing (unit testing, white-box)
 Functional testing (black-box)



- Secure coding depends on "functional testing"
 - <u>Functional testing:</u> "verifies a program by checking it against ... design document(s) or specification(s)"
 - <u>System testing</u>: "validate[s] a program by checking it against the published user or system requirements"

(Kaner, Falk, Nguyen. Testing Computer Software. Wiley Computer Publishing, 1999)

- Operational testing = white-box testing \rightarrow unit-test
 - (<u>http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operational_acceptance_testing</u>)
- Functional testing = black-box testing
 - (<u>http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Functional_testing</u>)



PYTHON → use with moderation

We have seen some powerful tools written in python but what about the security of python itself?

- Are there operations to avoid?
- Any module or core library to use with caution?
- Something to know before writing code for security?



• EXAMPLE – numeric overflow

RESULT (debian 7 x64)

N = 2 ** 63 for n in xrange(N): print n Traceback (most recent call last):

File "xrange_overflow.py", line 5, in <module> for n in xrange(N):

OverflowError: Python int too large to convert to C long

PROBLEM: xrange uses "Plain Integer Objects" created by the OS **SOLUTION**: Use python "long integer object" that will allow numbers of arbitrary length as the limit will be the system's memory.



• EXAMPLE – operations with file descriptors

RESULT

import sys import io

```
fd = io.open(sys.stdout.fileno(), 'wb')
fd.close()
```


try: sys.stdout.write("test for error") except Exception: raise close failed in file object destructor: sys.excepthook is missing lost sys.stderr

Code is trying to write a non-zero amount of data to something that does not exists.

The file descriptor has been closed and nothing can be sent, but python has no control over it and returns a system error.



• EXAMPLE - File descriptors in Windows



sys.stdout.write("Now writing to stdout closed FD will cause a crash")



• EXAMPLE – string evaluation

import sys	C:\Python27>python -OOBtt mess.py 'clear' is not recognized as an internal or external command, operable program or batch file. Module OS loaded by eval	
try:	non27>	
eval("import('os').system #eval("import('os').system print "Module OS loaded by e	m(cls')", {})	
except Exception as e: print repr(e)	C:∖Python27>	

The function "eval" executes a string but is not possible to any control to the operation. Malicious code is executed without limits in the context of the user that loaded the interpreter.

REALLY DANGEROUS



• EXAMPLE – input evaluation

Secret = "A SECRET DATA" Public = "a COCONUT" value = input("Please enter your age ") print "There are",value, print "monkeys looking for",Public	What you type as input is interpreted through an expression and the result is saved into your target variable with no control or limits.
python -OOBRtt input_1.py Please enter your age 32 There are 32 monkeys looking for a COCONUT	
python -OOBRtt input_1.py	The dir() function returns "most" of the attributes of an object.
Please enter your age <u>dir()</u> There are ['Public', 'Secret', 'builtins', 'doc looking for a COCONUT	<mark>', 'file', 'name', 'package']</mark> monkeys
python -OOBRtt input_1.py Please enter your age <u>Secret</u> There are A SECRET DATA monkeys looking for a COC	CONUT



Unicode string encode/decode

RESULT

Correct-String "u'A\\ufffdBC\\ufffd"" CODECS-String "u'A\\ufffdBC'" IO-String "u'A\\ufffdBC\\ufffd" → KNOWN GOOD STRING
→ WRONG
→ OK

The problem is due to a bug in the "codec" library that detects the character "F4" and assumes this is the first character of a sequence of characters and wait to receive the remaining 3 bytes, and the resulting string is truncated.

A better and safer approach would be to read the entire stream and only then proceed to the decoding phase, as done by the "*io*" module.



CODE – Unicode string encode/decode

```
import codecs
import io
try:
  ascii
except NameError:
  ascii = repr
b = b' x41 xF5 x42 x43 xF4'
print("Correct-String %r") % ((ascii(b.decode('utf8', 'replace'))))
with open('temp.bin', 'wb') as fout:
  fout.write(b)
with codecs.open('temp.bin', encoding='utf8', errors='replace') as fin: \leftarrow ISSUE HERE
  print("CODECS-String %r") % (ascii(fin.read()))
with io.open('temp.bin', 'rt', encoding='utf8', errors='replace') as fin:
  print("IO-String %r") % (ascii(fin.read()))
```



• EXAMPLE – data corruption with "cPickle"

```
import os
import cPickle
import traceback
random string = os.urandom(int(2147483648))
print ("STRING-LENGTH-1=%r") % (len(random_string))
fout = open('test.pickle', 'wb')
try:
  cPickle.dump(random string, fout)
except Exception as e:
  print "###### ERROR-WRITE ######"
  print sys.exc info()[0]
  raise
fout.close()
fin = open('test.pickle', 'rb')
try:
  random string2 = cPickle.load(fin)
except Exception as e:
  print "###### ERROR-READ ######"
  print sys.exc info()[0]
  raise
print ("STRING-LENGTH-2=%r") % (len(random string2))
print random string == random string2
```

pickle/CPICKLE (debian 7 x64) LIMIT = 2147483648 -1 = 2147483647

<u>(32bit integer object)</u> TEST WITH STRING SIZE "2147483647"

ALL OK

TEST using cPickle (data corruption)

TEST WITH STRING SIZE "2147483648" ###### ERROR-WRITE ###### <type 'exceptions.SystemError'>

File "pickle_2.py", line 18, in <module> pickle.dump(random_string, fout)

SystemError: error return without exception set



• EXAMPLE – data corruption with "pickle"

```
import os
import pickle
import traceback
random string = os.urandom(int(2147483648))
print ("STRING-LENGTH-1=%r") % (len(random string))
fout = open('test.pickle', 'wb')
try:
  pickle.dump(random string, fout)
except Exception as e:
  print "###### ERROR-WRITE ######"
  print sys.exc info()[0]
  raise
fout.close()
fin = open('test.pickle', 'rb')
try:
  random string2 = pickle.load(fin)
except Exception as e:
  print "###### ERROR-READ ######"
  print sys.exc_info()[0]
  raise
print ("STRING-LENGTH-2=%r") % (len(random string2))
print random string == random string2
```

pickle/CPICKLE (debian 7 x64) LIMIT = 2147483648 -1 = 2147483647

<u>(32bit integer object)</u> TEST WITH STRING SIZE "2147483647"

ALL OK

TEST using pickle (data corruption)

TEST WITH STRING SIZE "2147483648" ###### ERROR-WRITE ###### <type 'exceptions.MemoryError'>

File **"/usr/lib/python2.7/pickle.py**", line 488, in save_string self.write(STRING + repr(obj) + '\n') <u>MemoryError</u>



• EXAMPLE – unrestricted code in "pickle"

import pickle

obj = pickle.load(open('./bug.pickle')) print "== Object ==" print repr(obj)

bug.pickle

COS

system

(S'<u>ls -al /'</u>

tR.

drwxr-xr-x 24 root root 4096 Feb 28 01:42. drwxr-xr-x 24 root root 4096 Feb 28 01:42 ... drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 Feb 28 01:14 bin drwxr-xr-x 158 root root 12288 Apr 30 22:16 etc drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 4096 Feb 28 00:45 home drwx----- 2 root root 16384 Feb 27 23:25 lost+found drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 4096 May 2 09:18 media drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 Dec 4 12:31 mnt drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 Feb 27 23:26 opt dr-xr-xr-x 316 root root 0 Apr 16 12:21 proc drwx----- 7 root root 4096 Mar 7 23:09 root drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 Feb 28 01:55 sbin drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 Feb 27 23:26 srv drwxr-xr-x 13 root root 0 Apr 16 12:21 sys drwxrwxrwt 13 root root 4096 May 2 14:57 tmp drwxr-xr-x 10 root root 4096 Feb 27 23:26 usr drwxr-xr-x 13 root root 4096 Feb 28 07:21 var

WARNING: pickle or cPickle are NOT designed as safe/secure solution for serialization



• EXAMPLE – inconsistent "pickle" serialization

<u>RESULT</u>

b'cUserList\ndefaultdict\nq\x00)Rq\x01.' b'ccollections\ndefaultdict\nq\x00)Rq\x01.' b'\x80\x02cUserList\ndefaultdict\nq\x00)Rq\x01.' b'\x80\x02ccollections\ndefaultdict\nq\x00)Rq\x01.'

(http://hg.python.org/cpython/file/7272ef213b7c/Li b/_compat_pickle.py at line 80)

If there's a "collections.defaultdict" in the pickle dump, python 3 pickles it to "UserString.defaultdict" instead of "collections.defaultdict" <u>even if python</u> <u>2.7 and 2.6 do not have a "defaultdict" class in</u> <u>"UserString".</u>

python 3 import pickle import collections dct = collections.defaultdict() f = pickle.dumps(dct, protocol=1) print (repr(f)) g = pickle.dumps(dct, protocol=1, fix imports=False) print (repr(g)) *h* = *pickle.dumps(dct, protocol=2)* print (repr(h)) *i* = pickle.dumps(dct, protocol=2, fix_imports=False) print (repr(i))



EXAMPLE – review of pickle/cPickle

- Main problems: code injection, data corruption

- cPickle: severe errors as exceptions are "lost" even if an error is generated and signalled by the O.S.
- pickle: no controls on data/object integrity
- pickle: no control on data size or system limitations
- pickle: code evaluated without security controls
- pickle: string encoded/decoded without verification



• EXAMPLE – socket remains open after error ..

OPEN IN TERMINAL 1 (one line):

python -m smtpd -n -c DebuggingServer localhost:45678

OPEN IN TERMINAL 2: python -OOBRtt smtplib_1.py import smtplib
try:
 s = smtplib.SMTP_SSL("localhost", 45678)
except Exception:
 raise

RESULT:

ssl.SSLError: [Errno 1] _ssl.c:504: error:140770FC:SSL routines:SSL23_GET_SERVER_HELLO:unknown protocol

lsof -P | grep python | grep ":45678" python 16725 user01 3u IPv4 31510356 0t0 TCP localhost:45678 (LISTEN)

The underlying socket connection remains open, but you can't access it or close it.



• EXAMPLE – "unlimited data" in POP3

CLIENT

python -OOBRtt pop3_client.py Connecting to '127.0.0.1':45678... Welcome: '+OK THIS IS A TEST' Error: 'out of memory'

```
import poplib
HOST = '127.0.0.1'
PORT = 45678
try:
    print "Connecting to %r:%d..." % (HOST, PORT)
    pop = poplib.POP3(HOST, PORT)
    print "Welcome:", repr(pop.welcome)
    print "Listing..."
    reply = pop.list()
    print "LIST:", repr(reply)
except Exception, ex:
    print "Error: %r" % str(ex)
```

```
print "End."
```

```
import socket
HOST = '127.0.0.1'
PORT = 45678
NULLS = '\0' * (1024 * 1024) # 1 MB
sock = socket.socket()
sock.bind((HOST, PORT))
sock.listen(1)
while 1:
conn, = sock.accept()
conn.sendall("+OK THIS IS A TEST\r\n")
  conn.recv(4096)
  DATA = NULLS
  try:
    while 1:
      for in xrange(1024):
        conn.sendall(DATA)
  except IOError, ex:
    print "Error: %r" % str(ex)
```

SERVER



• EXAMPLE – leaks in poplib/urllib/smtplib ...

python -OOBRtt pop3_server.py
Traceback (most recent call last):
 File "pop3_server.py", line 12, in <module>
 sock.bind((HOST, PORT))
 File "/usr/lib/python2.7/socket.py", line 224, in meth
 return getattr(self._sock,name)(*args)
socket.error: [Errno 98] Address already in use

If python process has an error the <u>exception</u> will not reliably close all file and socket file descriptors (handles) leading to <u>leaks</u> and <u>uncontrollable</u> background processes

ps aux | grep pop3 user01 30574 0.0 0.0 33256 6052 ? S 19:34 0:00 /usr/bin/python -OOBRtt pop3_server.py lsof -P | grep python | grep pop3 pop3_serv 30574 user01 txt /usr/bin/python2.7 pop3_serv 30574 user01 mem REG /usr/lib/python2.7/lib-dynload/_ssl.so



• EXAMPLE – libs with "unlimited data" issues

HTTPLIB \rightarrow <u>http://bugs.python.org/issue16037</u> (fixed) FTPLIB \rightarrow <u>http://bugs.python.org/issue16038</u> (fixed) IMAPLIB \rightarrow <u>http://bugs.python.org/issue16039</u> (fixed) NNTPLIB \rightarrow <u>http://bugs.python.org/issue16040</u> (fixed) POPLIB \rightarrow <u>http://bugs.python.org/issue16041</u> SMTPLIB \rightarrow <u>http://bugs.python.org/issue16042</u> XMLRPC \rightarrow <u>http://bugs.python.org/issue16043</u>



Small list of <u>KNOWN UNSAFE</u> python components

ast bastion commands cookie cPickle eval marshal mktemp multiprocessing os.exec os.popen os.spawn os.system parser pickle pipes

pty rexec shelve subprocess tarfile yaml zipfile



• PYTHON for the web?

Requests	HTTPie	ProxMon	WSMap
Twill	Ghost	Windmill	FunkLoad
spynner	mitmproxy	pathod / pathoc	scrapy

• PYTHON for offensive actions?

Plenty of *dangerous* python tools in "packet storm security" website:

• <u>http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/tags/python/</u>

More general tools:

<u>http://pythonsource.com/</u>



• **PYTHON** for reverse engineering?

Androguard	IDAPython	pyasm2	pype32
apkjet	libdisassemble	PyBFD	python-adb
AsmJit-Python	llvmpy	PyCodin	python-ptrace
BeaEnginePython	Miasm	pydasm	PythonGdb
Binwalk	ollydbg2-python	PyDBG	PyVEX
Buggery	OllyPython	pydbgr	pywindbg
cuckoo	PDBparse	PyELF	Rekall
Disass	pefile	pyew	Vivisect
ElfParserLib	PIDA	pygdb2	Volatility
Frida	PyADB	pyMem	WinAppDbg



<u>Closing Summary</u>

 Python is a *powerful* and *easy to learn* language **BUT** has to be used with care.

 There are <u>no limits</u> or controls in the language, is <u>responsibility of the coder to know what can</u> <u>be done and what to avoid.</u>



Secure Coding Review

Server Issues

Misconfiguration Application headers Application Errors Default files Default Locations Traffic in clear text Vulnerable to DoS Vulnerable to MITM

Crypto Issues

Weak ciphers Small keys Invalid SSL certs

Access class to Monitor

Local network Local access only Remote Network Access

Vulnerabilities to Check

Format String Buffer Errors Credentials Management Cryptographic Issues Information Leak Input Validation OS Command Injections SQL Injection

Architectural Aspects

Kernel Architecture Data write policy NIC configuration Entropy pool

Language Issues

File operations Object evaluations Instruction Validation Variable Manipulation String/Input Evaluation Unicode encode/decode Serialization Data limits



Contact Enrico Branca

"OWASP Python Security Project" http://www.pythonsecurity.org/

Email: <u>enrico.branca@owasp.org</u> Linkedin: <u>http://fr.linkedin.com/in/ebranca</u>